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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Article is to facilitate an understanding of the
nature of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) through an analysis of
different ideas of property rights, as enshrined and elaborated by law and
political literature.
In the second part of the Article, peculiarities of IPRs and their main
differences from property rights are sketched out. Furthermore, a
methodological approach is briefly drawn. The third part takes into
account the rationale and the purposes of property rights according to the
main philosophical and political mainstreams in the United States in the
twentieth century. The fourth, and last part, is devoted to the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), in the
light of the previously analyzed theories, and draws a brief conclusion.
It is suggested that the particular relationship existing between two
different conceptions of property rights may also be found in the
framework of IPRs. It is also argued that this kind of relationship may shed
light on the actual shape of IPRs and promote a proper construction of
them.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

Intellectual property represents a particular form of ownership.' It
represents a property right in an intangible, abstract idea expressed in
tangible form.2 An essential feature of property rights in general, is the
"right of exclusion." It is the power that "may be exercised to the

1. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988) ("Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the
attributes of personal property."). For a discussion of similarities and differences between

intellectual property and personal-real property, see

HAROLD EiNHORN, PATENT LICENSING

§ 1.01 (2002) (many of the aspects of patent rights are closer to those of real rather
than personal property. For example, an action of infringement is similar to an action of trespass
and there is an established system of use by permission of the owner); Edwin C. Hettinger,
TRANSACTIONS,

Justifying Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 17 (Adam D. Moore ed., 1997);

PETER DRAHOS, A PILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, § 7 (1996) (intellectual property in
abstract objects "equals" information and information in turn "equals" knowledge as described by
Karl Popper); Karl Popper, OBiECTIvE KNOWLEDGE, A REAuSTIC VIEw OF LOGIC, PHYSICS AND
HISTORY, ch. 2 (1972) (Popper's analogy between knowledge and honey bees may also be
enlightening.).
2. Such as literary and artistic works, symbols, names, images, designs, and inventions used
in commerce.
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exclusion of all others, freely and without restrictions."' This is an attribute
of IPRs as well. In fact, in defining a patent, one of the most representative
IPRs, the United States International Trade Commission states that a
patent is "a grant issued by a national government conferring the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention .
However, a peculiar characteristic of intellectual creations, from an
ontological point of view, is "non-exclusivity." This means that
intellectual creations can be at many places at once and are not consumed
by their use. On the other hand, it is very different when the object of
ownership is a res, such as a parcel of land.5 The pure possession or use of
that parcel by one person prevents others from possessing or using it.6
Land, like almost every other resource, is limited and thus, private
property rights are needed to "fence" the land in order to ensure peaceful
possession 7by the owners and to avoid the dreaded "tragedy of the
commons."

Irrespective of the verity of the latter hypothesis and, generally, leaving
aside all the moral and legal justifications for property rights, it must be
noted that intellectual creation, as opposed to the object of private property
rights, is not limited in nature; that is, once the intellectual creation is born
it is potentially available, without limits, to everyone. Listening to a song
does not preclude others from listening to the same song at the same time
for all time (this characteristic of IPRs is called "non-rivalry"). 8 Therefore,
the state must step in and protect the rights holder, giving him the power
to prevent others from using his creation, thereby making it artificially
scarce. Indeed, without the state's intervention the rights holder could do
nothing to prevent unauthorized use of his creation.

3. See generally HENRY JOHN ROBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF JUSTINIAN'S
DIGEST(1886).
4. See ANTHONY D'AMATO & DORIS ESTELLE LONG, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 3 (1997) (emphasis added). The same power is granted by all international

agreements that deal with IPRs. See, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual
Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583 (as revised on July 14, 1967 in Stockholm); see also
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. art. 28 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].
5. It would be the same if the property were personal and not real.
6. See, e.g., GARRETr HARDIN, THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS (1968); JULES L.
COLEMAN, READINGS INTHE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Garland Pub. ed. 1999).
7. See HARDIN, supra note 6, at 552.
8. See Patrick Croskery, Institutional Utilitarianismand Intellectual Property, 68 CI.KENT L. REv. 631, 631-33 (1993).
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To be sure, there are some means available to the IPRs holder, such as
contracts and other self-help means (e.g., encryption), but they are either
imperfect substitutes of the state protection or only limited to some IPRs
(encryption, for instance, can serve only the interest of a copyright holder
and only for limited "works of authorship"). Hence, the state must step in
to ensure the protection of the right holder that he or she cannot otherwise
obtain. A clear example is the strong protection accorded to a patent
holder, who can rely on the strict liability9 that would occur whenever
someone uses (or sells, offers to sell, etc.) the inventor's device without his
or her permission."0 Such a strong defense against infringement is almost
unthinkable without legislative and judicial (i.e., state) intervention.
Usually, economics and law face, as fundamental problems, the
scarcity of resources and their subsequent cost. With IPRs the problem
becomes how "to measure out" the scarcity (i.e., the scope of the power of
exclusion) between the owner (the rights holder) and society (the
community). The "scarcity" created by the granting of IPRs is modulated
by different constructs of property rights, which inevitably affect the
relation between the values at stake.
III. DIFFERENT VALUES AND DIFFERENT APPROACHES

The frame of reference in which the IPRs are encompassed is the
international legal framework and, in particular, that of World Trade
Organization (WTO). The values that are enshrined in that framework
could be certainly defined as liberal." When analyzing liberal thought,
whether truly liberal (strictosensu) or not, the author is aware of his own
partiality in terms of commonly accepted abstract principles, such as

9. Strict liability is that particular liability that does not depend on actual negligence or
intent to harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something safe. It is also
termed absolute liability or liability without fault. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
10. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(d)(l)(A)(I), 271(a)-(c) (2004).
11. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 654 (2001); see
also the definition of "liberal" in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 3 (Paul Edward ed., 1972).
In a very broad sense, the word "liberal" describes one of several ideologies that asserts the liberty
of the individual to dissent from orthodox tenets or established authorities in political or religious
matters. It attempts to circumscribe the limits of political power and to define inalienable individual
rights. It is often seen as being the ideology of the Industrial Revolution and the subsequent
capitalist system. Ideas such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of thought
were first proposed by classical liberal scholars.

20051

THE DIALECTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

159

"rights, majority rule, the rule of law, Judeo-Christian morality."'"
However, when discussing the various forms that property rights may take,
the interests and values shared by other approaches 3 will be taken into
account. Different views are critical when "shaping" the scope and
structure of property rights, since the satisfaction of interests is the starting
point for the process that leads to the "rule of law."' 4 As an example, the
interests of industrial exploitation of intellectual capital (the objective of
any patent) should be considered in connection with the different interests
of nonindustrial uses of intellectual property."
A. Two Different Ideas of Property
Different concepts of property exist in different legal systems as well
as in legal theory.' 6 Attention here will be focused on two, in a sense,
opposite ideas of property: property as a commodity and, on the other
hand, property open to "social needs." 7 In the construct of property rights,
the social aspect, even though it never completely fades away, 8 can range

12. See James T. Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance:
Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1996, 2016
(2000).
13. For an outlook on a different approach such as the third world approaches to international
law, see James T. Gathii, Alternative and Critical: The Contribution ofResearch and Scholarship
on Developing Countries to International Legal Theory, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 263 (2000); James
Gathii, Third World Approach to International Law Vision Statement, at http://www2.als.edu/
faculty/jgathii/twail.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2004).
14. BIGLIAZZI GERI ETAL., PRIVATE LAW 288 (1986); see also A.M. HonorS, Ownership, in
READINGS INTHE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 6, at 557 (that is a very important lesson that
must be kept in mind, for example, in analyzing emerging IPRs like those concerning "traditional
knowledge"); cf Mark Ritchie, Kristin Dawkins, & Mark Vallianatos, Intellectual Property Rights
and Biodiversity: The Industrialization ofNatural Resources and Traditional Knowledge, 11 ST.
JoHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 431 (1996).
15. See James Gathii, Research Agenda, athttp://www2.als.edu/facu4ty/jgathii/research.html
(last visited Dec. 2, 2004).
16. Different conceptions exist in the considered legal-framework as well. For some
distinctions, see generally James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003) (Boyle starts his analysis by asking
whether public domain is "the opposite of property," and stating that it is impossible to think about
the public domain or commons without considering the two basic ideas of property).
17. For an explanation of "social function" and the "social relation approach," see Joseph
William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 614-750 (1988). For our
purposes, "social function" equals "public function." See also Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to
Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841
(1993).
18. See Honord, Ownership, in READINGS INTHE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 6, at 594-

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW&

POLICY

[
[Vol.
I0

from a very limited incidence to a large, broad influence. When the social
aspect is almost nonexistent, property rights are deemed a "commodity"
and what is stressed is the "power" of the owner. Con('ersely, emphasis on
the social aspect of ownership stresses the interests of society as a whole,
as opposed to those of the owner alone. 9
In an effort to simplify a very complex reality,, one can argue that
different theories, with different contexts and premises, can be reduced, as
far as the construction of property rights is concerned, to either of the two
ideas mentioned above. For example, some scholars20 who are sensitive to
the social function of property rights surprisingly recognize that "the
ability to alienate is the most fundamental stick in the property bundle."'"
Interestingly, this is exactly what F. Von Hayek argued in the 1940s.22 For
Von Hayek, who was very much skeptical about the "social function" of
property rights and highly hostile about IPRs,23 the commodification of
property to its maximum extent is a necessary prerequisite for individuals
to pursue their own ends and in so doing, to pursue individual liberty.24 In
other words, notwithstanding the deep political. and philosophical
differences among the aformentioned scholars, it seems, primafacie,that
the result in regard to the "shape" of property rights is the same.
B. Law and Politics
There is no way to articulate political theory without affecting the
concept of property and impacting, in some way, the relationship between
the two elements (single owner versus society) always in constant
tension.25 Indeed, the idea and the content of the "rule of law" are an
outcome of the philosophical and political thought that underpin any given
society at any given time and space.26
Since "law is politics," it will be interesting to examine the way
property rights are "shaped" and interpreted according to liberal thought
from the twentieth century to the present. Since property rights serve as a
model for intellectual property rights, then each .political view will
influence (or presuppose) their construct and scope.' In fact, it is posited

19. To expand on this subject, see, e.g., id.
20. See Boyle, supra note 16, at 22.
21. Usually the social function imposes a reduction of the right of disposition to guarantee
the interest of the counter-party. See id.
22. See generally FREDERIC VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
23. See infra Part III.D.
24. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 366 (1997).
25. See Singer, supra note 17, at 9.
26. See Gathii, supra note 12, at 1997 ("Law is politics!").
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here that a "general theory of property illuminates [mutatis mutandis]
intellectual property."' 27 The focus will be on the political debate that has
occurred during the twentieth century in the United States and its
consequences on the function and rationale of property rights.
This approach may promote a better understanding of both the premise
of the current concept of IPRs and the rationale behind international
agreements concerning IPRs. This paper will specifically focus on the
28
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPs)
within the legal framework of the WTO, 29 because of its relevance in
international law.3"
1. The Classical Idea of Property
The classical idea of property rights and ownership derives from the
idea of property as an "absolute"'" dominion. This is the idea of property
rights that were in use in Roman law that the scope of property rights
extends "usque adsideraet usque ad inferos" (from the underworld to the
stars). However, it must be made clear that, as far as the social control of
property rights is concerned, ownership has never really been absolute.
Even in the most individualistic age of Rome, ownership could have a
social aspect, such as the liability for the execution
3 2 of a debt and the
possibility of expropriation by the public authority.
Sir William Blackstone, whose influence was strong in the United
States, describes the idea of property rights as a simple and nonsocial
relationship between a person and a thing.33 His main point is that the
function of private property is to secure freedom and autonomy for
individuals. Blackstone writes, at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
that property rights are conceived as the "[s]ole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world,

27. Cf.DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 1.
28. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4.
29. See id
30. See, e.g., GABPRELLA VENTURINi, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANiZATION (2000).
31. "Absolute" is used "to deny the temporary, intransmissible or determinate character of
an interest; sometimes to deny the defeasible character of an interest,... ; sometimes to emphasize
its exemption from social control." See Honord, Ownership, in READINGS INTHE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW, supra note 6, at 594.
32. See, e.g., Francesco De Martino, Individualismand Roman Private Law, in LAW AND
SOCIETY INANCIENT ROME (Giuffrd ed., 1979) (showing how the paterfamilias' property rights
were limited by the public interest).
33. See generally Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, in
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 16 (St. George Tucker ed., 1969).
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in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."34
Under this idea, property links only the owner to the object; there is no
relationship with any other person. The owner could do anything he wants
with his property. In fact, the right to own property is defined by
Blackstone as an absolute right that "pertains to particular men merely as
individuals or single persons,"35 whereas a relative right is "one which is
incident to men as members ofsociety and standing in various relationsto
' Indeed, Blackstone's idea of property is much more
each other."36
"absolute" than the one conceived by the Romans.

2. The Legal Realist and "The New Property"
At the beginning of the twentieth century in the United States, there
arose a shift from the Blackstonian person-thing conception of ownership
to a social, or relational, conception of ownership.3" The legal realist
movement illuminated for the first time in the United States the complex
and relational character of ownership.3" By this time, the metaphor of
property as a "bundle of rights" was being used to describe ownership.39
In this new stream of thought, ownership was interpreted as a complex set
of legal relations in which individuals are interdependent. Some degree of
social interference with one person's ownership interest was deemed
inevitable, but the real question was which interferences should be legally

34. Id. at 1.
35. See JEROME C. KNOWLTON, QUESTIONS AND ANswERS IN BLACKSTONE 261 (1922).
36. Id
37. For a better understanding of this shift, one should contextualize and remember that at
the outset of the twentieth century there was tremendous economic, political, and social upheaval.
It was a period of boom in capitalism and industrialization with deep economic changes that
widened the gap between the haves and have-nots. The boom was followed by a deeply economic
recession that hit the United States and, after a while, all the other industrialized countries. That
social and economical turmoil fostered the idea that adjustments in the relationship between
governments and the private sphere were necessary to adapt American law and politics to changing
economic and social conditions. With a great wave of poverty and unemployment, a reform that
could achieve social and political justice was necessary. Achieving that goal was indeed crucial to
change the way of thinking about some basic "social structure" like the idea of property rights
(without any revolution, however).
38. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld is deemed to be the father of so-called "legal realism." See
generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FuNDAmENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS

(W.W. Cook 1978)

(1919).
39. See ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 352-77 (pointing out that this metaphor indicates, for
the first time, three aspects of the ownership: "first, it indicates that ownership is a complex legal
relation. Second, the metaphor illuminates the fact that the constitutive elements of that relationship
are legal rights. Third, ... it underscores the social character of that relationship").
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prohibited and which should be permitted.4 ° The most important point is
that there is no analytical or deductive answer to that question; it depends
strictly upon which policies a society decides to promote at a given time. 41
Other scholars 42 worked on the implications of the relational
conception of ownership. "[T]he truth is, there are two sides to private
property, the individual side and the social side. . . .

They did not

consider the social aspect to be an exception, but rather an essential part
of the institution of property.
[T]he social side of property might be lost or deteriorate if it were
not enforced, especially in cultures whose ideologies emphasized
the individual aspect of property ownership. While individuals have
incentives to maximize control over their own property, they lack
incentives to monitor the use of property interests that they share in
common with others. For each individual, the costs of policing the
social side of property greatly exceed the individual gains, so each
individual chooses to neglect the social side. As a result, aggregate
social welfare diminishes unless the state, as society's agent, acts
to protect the social side. 44
It was the first time in American history that a social function of property
was put forth in such a vigorous way.
The prominent role that the legal realists' view played was to promote
the idea that the social side of private ownership supersedes the individual
side.45 This assertion of the social function has deeply changed the
structure of property rights ever since. It represents the basis for the
construct of property rights in many national contexts and usually is
guaranteed by a state's constitution. 46 At the international level, however,

40. Id. at 323.
41. This is another strong critique made by the legal realists. There is no neutral procedure
to construct a law or a norm or, in general, a legal rule. It is always a matter of ideology or policy
which is often hidden behind the shield of a formal, logical deduction or reasoning. Id
42. See generally RICHARD T. ELYIN, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE
DISTRIBUTION ON WEALTH (1914).
43. Id. at 136.
44. See ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 326.

45. Although this affirmation is highly controversial when speaking of real property, it might
be different in the arena of intellectual property rights. In fact, the reason why the IPRs were
established was to promote the spread of knowledge and thus for a social purpose. See, e.g., U.S.
8.
CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.
46. See GERI ET AL., supra note 14, at 290 (discussing the Italian legal framework).
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the problem remains how to promote this social side. Since there is no
central government in the international arena to act as a state and safeguard
the social interest, how can the social function be protected? 7 The problem
is to find a via media between absolute private property and "socialized
property."
Classical liberalists define freedom negatively: individual liberty is
freedom from interference by the state. In this view, individuals act
independently of each other. Within this model, the role of property is to
protect the individual's liberty by creating for each owner a zone of
autonomy.48 The state's sole legitimate role is to protect that zone by
preventing others from unauthorized invasion. 49 Among legal realists as
well, private ownership confers certain negative rights to individual
owners (e.g., freedom from the state), but it is also subject to positive
duties in the public interest.5 In the legal realist view for every right there
must be a duty; there is no right without duty5 and duty is owed to the
society as a whole. This framework seems to be reproduced in all
intellectual property rights systems. For example, patent laws usually
provide the rights holder with both negative rights (e.g., he or she can
prevent others from using his or her invention, etc.) and "positive duties"
such as the duty to implement the idea covered by the patent (otherwise he
or she will be subject to the compulsory license). 2

47. For a first attempt in that direction, see James T. Gathii, ConstruingIntellectual Property
Rights and Competition Policy Consistently with Facilitating Access to Affordable AIDS Drugs to
Low-End Consumers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 727 (200 1) (suggesting a particular construction of the TRIPs
agreement that would let the "social function" of the intellectual property rights emerge). It must
be noticed, however, that the problem is much larger. Some of the fundamental international
organizations like the World Bank or the WTO pretend to act neutrally, i.e., on the basis of the
mere economic or trade policy. See id. Another possibility might be to use the International
Economic Constitution, once we agree it exists, to assert the influence of the social function. See
generally Gathii, supra note 15.
48. See ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 341.
49. This is the idea of the minimal state. See ROBERT NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA, Introduction (1974).
50. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGE OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS
OF OWNERSHIP (2000); see generally Singer, supra note 17 (pointing out the duties that owners

have toward the society, and arguing that even corporate power should not be exercised for the
exclusive benefit of shareholders but for the benefit of society as a whole).
51. This is a very powerful idea from a political point of view that tends to change the former
idea of the social relation. However, it must be kept in mind that from a rigorous legal point of
view, property rights (strictosensu) in the civil law system have no "duty" but only limits. See GERI
ETAL., supra note 14, at 288.
52. The legal institution of "compulsory license," provided for in many countries and
fundamental IPRs' international treaties, is not included in the U.S. law.

20051

THE DIALECTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

165

This new idea of property was ushered into the legal framework by
legal statutes and
judicial decisions53 only with the emergence of the
' Social
"welfare state."54
welfare programs undermined the "commodity
55
conception.
Various types of property, which were traditionally
regarded as market assets, came to be seen as serving other, non-market
functions. Moreover, the law began to protect the "noncommodified"
aspects of property arrangements. Landlord and tenant law provides a clear
example. 5 A "New Property" was born.57
C. An Italian ScholarshipApproach: An Example of a Civil
Law Attitude58
In the civil law system, and, above all, in those countries where Roman
influence was strong, private property rights are the essential core of the
"Droit Subjectif' (the Italian "Diritto Soggettivo") as developed by the
French and, later on, by German and Italian scholarship.59 The droit
subjectifintendsto express the liberty of the human being.' It constitutes
the absolute freedom of the subject from everything that constrains him,
and it grants him the power to do something, to concretely act and modify
the "legal reality."' The droitsubjectifis construed as an "agere licere,"
which means that the holder of the right has the power and the possibility

53. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 24, § XII.
54. The welfare state in the United States refers to the New Deal program enacted by
President Roosevelt in response to the Great Depression.
55. The "commodity conception" is a concept used by Alexander to underscore the classical
idea of property (and reintroduced in the 1970s by neoliberals like Nozick) as an exclusive link
between a person and an object, a property with no constraints whatsoever. According to this idea,
the property's function is to help the human being to satisfy personal preference through market
transactions. Hence, property must always be available as market property, precisely, as a
commodity. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 24.
56. See ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 362 (showing how the landlord by now has an
increased array of duties toward the tenant and how this was a radical reversal in judicial decision
and theory). The basis for this change was, in summary, the shift from the idea of the ownership
of a house as an investment (commodity conception) to an idea of house ownership as a tool to
satisfy a basic human need. The interest that underpins the property is no longer fungible. Id.; see
also Margaret Jane Radin, ResidentialRent Control, 15 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. (1986).
57. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 24, § XII.
58. The comparison between American legal thought and the Italian is arbitrary and does not
take into account other possible approaches existing in other civil countries and traditions.
59. See Riccardo Orestano, Subjective Right and Subject Without Right, in Jus, VrrA E
PENsiERO 50 (1960).
60. See generally id. (for the historical-ideological context).
61. See GERI ETAL., supra note 14, at 288.
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to achieve and fulfill his interests. In this context, there is no room for any
duty. Duties would contradict the natural freedom of the right.
In construing anew the droit subjectif, it seems that some Italian
scholarship sustains the legal realistic approach. 2 This approach affirms
that the diritto soggettivo lives within the reality of the social context and
is subject to that reality's constraints. It supports the view that there are
other values that limit the fulfillment of the individual's interests. Indeed,
like the legal realists at the outset of the twentieth century in the United
States, this scholarship takes into account values and interests that are
different from the exclusive interest of the single owner. It acknowledges
the legitimacy of the social function of property rights 63 set forth by the
Italian Constitution."
As far as the international arena is concerned, whether a constitution
exists is a matter of controversy, 65 one may argue, as already stated, 66 that
an array of principles exists that acts like a "form of international
constitution. '6 Indeed, rules and principles that provide for "rights of
solidarity" (such as social and economic development) can also be found
in the international framework" and they can be used to support a different
way of thinking about property rights, and consequently IPRs.
1. Libertarian and Egalitarian Liberals
In the 1950s Friedrich Von Hayek strongly opposed the premise and
consequences of the "new property. '69 He opposed the whole idea of
welfare states and, generally, the intervention of the state in the market.
Within the framework of his theory, property only has the role of
satisfying individual preferences.
To fulfill that role, property must be free from collective constraints
on use, possession, and, most important of all, transfer ....

The

62. Id. § VI; see also Singer, supra note 17, at 618-21.
63. See GERIET AL., supra note 14, at 288.

64. See ITALY CONST. art. 42, § 1.
65. Cf PAOLO PICONE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND ECONOMIC CONSTITU)TION IN

constitution
in the international environment).
66. See supra text accompanying note 47.
67. See, e.g., INGRID DETrER, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 30 (1994).
68. See, e.g., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by General
Assembly of the United Nations, Resolution 217 A (III), Dec. 10, 1948, availableat http://www.
un.org/Overview/rights.html (last visited Oct. 15,2004); see alsoSCHARF, supranote 11, at 671-90.
69. See generally HAYEK, supra note 22.

THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK (1982) (arguing for the existence of an economic
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state's core legitimate function is to facilitate individual attempts to
satisfy personal preferences, which will ordinarily occur through
market transactions. Property, then, must always (or nearly always)
be available as market property, or commodity. °
The same idea of property is the basis of the political thought of Robert
Nozick in the very different context of the 1970s. For Nozick, rights are
not invented by the state, but rather, the state is a human invention that is
founded upon pre-existing rights. For Nozick, the primary task of the state
is to secure individual property rather than interfere with it. The result is
a "market-oriented" idea, an "ultra-minimum state." If certain rights are
so important, the state cannot step in and abridge them in any way. For
example, redistributive policies that tax the rich to help the poor violate
individual rights. 7' Egalitarian liberals 72 like John Rawls disagree:
"government should therefore assure each person, as a matter of right, a
decent level of such goods as education, income, housing, health care and
the like. 73
The relationship between Nozick and Rawls resembles, mutatis
mutandis, the political debate that occurred during the New Deal between
the defenders of the market economy and the advocates of the welfare
state. 74 Two different ideas of property came out of that debate and,
interestingly, the same two ideas emerged from the debate between the
libertarian and egalitarian liberals.
2. Communitarian Liberals
A strong attempt to challenge egalitarian liberalism comes from the
communitarians.75 It challenges one of the aspects endorsed by liberals
(both egalitarian and libertarian): the idea that "rights are prior, to the

70. ALEXANDER, supranote 24, at 366-67. Following this thought, it should be admitted as
a necessary consequence that property rights should be disseminated as much as possible. See supra
text accompanying note 50.
71. See Michael J. Sandel, Book Review, Political Liberalism, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1765,
1765 (1994).
72. These labels are very common: a first distinction is between utilitarian and rights-oriented
liberals. The words "right-oriented" underscore the respect for individual rights as opposed to the
utilitarian consideration.
73. Sandel, supranote 71, at 1765.
74. Id. at 1765-66.
75. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE, at XI (1998) (The
communitarian critique "holds that principles ofjustice depend for their justification on the moral
worth or intrinsic good of the ends they serve.").
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good," that is, the "neutrality" of the state.76 Communitarians maintain that
justice cannot be detached from any conception of the "good life," and that
rights depend for their justification on the moral importance of the ends
they serve. 77 This is the central critique of the communitarians against the
liberal's creed of "neutrality" of the state.78 Michael J. Sandel, one of the
major exponents of communitarian scholarship, criticizing egalitarian
liberals, asks "[w]hy should our political identities not express the moral
and religious and communal convictions we affirm in our personal
lives?" 7' 9 and again states that "rights cannot be neutral with respect to that
moral and religious controversy."'
These ideas led to a concept of property rights that is "permeable" to
public and social values. Since communitarians are sensitive to emerging
values and interests, and because they recognize the influence of the good
life in the lawmaking process, they can spur a "social-oriented view" of
the property that takes into account, inter alia, the demand for a more
equitable distribution of wealth"1 and for, more generally, "non-western"
approaches. For example, IPRs in the international arena are tailored to
enhance the interests of industrial exploitation of intellectual capital by
highlighting the role of the rights owner and underplaying the role of other
needs.8 2 The communitarian idea of property would take into account those
other needs, such as the nonindustrial uses of intellectual property (e.g.,
like food security and conservation) 3 and would be very useful in
counterbalancing the continuing trend in the expansion of IPRs. 4

76. See Sandel, supranote 71, at 1766. "Rights are prior to the good" has two meanings; first,
in the sense that certain individual rights (education, income, housing, etc.) "trump," or outweigh,
considerations of the common good. Id. Second, the "rights are prior to the good" means that the
state (rectius, the government) should be neutral (i.e., impartial, unbiased) among competing
conceptions of the good life and, hence, principles ofjustice that specify our rights do not depend
for their justification on any particular conception of the good life.
77. See id. at 1766-68.
78. See Michael J. Sandel, The PoliticalTheory of the ProceduralRepublic, in THE POWER
OF PUBLIC IDEAS (Robert B. Reich ed. 1988).
79. See Sandel, supra note 71, at 1774.
80. Id. at 1778.
81. See generallyGathii, supra note 12.
82. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 27, 30, 31.
83. See generally Gathii, supra note 12.
84. See Boyle, supra note 16, at 38-39; see also World Trade Organization, Ministerial
Declaration, adopted at the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference held in Doha, Qatar, Nov. 20, 2001
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration], available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto e/minist e/min0le/mindecle.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
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3. The Public Domain Debate
The theories that argue for a commodity perspective are usually those
that presuppose a marginal role of the state, like Von Hayek's. When the
focus shifts to intellectual property rights, those who argue for strong,
"impermeable" property rights hold that IPRs ought to be limited as much
as possible."5 It is, indeed, a coherent corollary of the libertarian premise. 6
For libertarian liberals, the state must avoid interfering with the private
rights of citizens and intellectual property rights, because of their nature
(i.e., non-excludable and non-rivalrous), require a strong intervention by
the state.
In the same way, the contemporary "public domain" school of thought
argues for limiting the scope and the expansion of IPRs.87 It assumes that
the public domain88 must be protected against a "new enclosure
movement."89 This scholarship opposes the creation of strong IPRs
because it believes thai the purpose of intellectual creation to serve all
humankind is better fulfilled by allowing intellectual creation to remain in
the public domain.
In the same stream of thought, some scholars9" have demonstrated the
economical efficiency of safeguarding the public domain. They also have
lamented the undue expansion of protection of intellectual ownership in
cyberspace and claim that, as far as domain names are concerned, a "new,
new property" has been created. This is a strong new property right that
serves the interests of western countries and is similar, to a certain extent,
to a colonialist movement. 91
D. Reifying the Public Domain
In legal thought, the general idea of right revolves around a specific
subject 92 who has an interest (that the rule of law considers worthy of

85. See FRIEDRICH VON HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 37 (1988).
86. Contra DRAHOS, supranote 1, at 53, 56.
87. See generally Boyle, supra note 16.
88. Part of"public domain" consists ofworks "free for appropriation, transfer, redistribution,
copying, and performance." See, e.g., id. at 68.
89. See generally id. The first enclosure movement refers to the process that began in
England in the fifteenth century of fencing off common land and turning it into private property.
See id. at 33-36.
90. See, e.g., Aunpam Chander, The New, New Property,81 TEX. L. REV. 715 (2003).
91. See generally id. at 779.
92. See Orestano, supra note 59.
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protection)93 and who is granted the power enshrined in the right. James
Boyle, however, attempts to shift that perspective by suggesting another
approach to broaden the scope of the public domain.94 He tries to reify the
concept of public domain by shifting attention away from the interest of
the single subject to the common interest of all subjects considered as a
unit. To accomplish this, all "scattered" interests must be fused into one
single but shared interest, thus creating a new concept of public domain.
In this way Boyle gives conceptual autonomy to the social aspect of
property and is able to "both clarify and to reshape perceptions of selfinterest"95 in a way that can lead to a new and more solidaristic idea of
property right.
IV. THE TRIPs AGREEMENT
The dialectic tension between the two ideas of property rights, when
applied to IPRs, is manifest in the TRIPs agreement.96 Administered by the
World Trade Organization the TRIPs agreement "together with the 1968
Stockholm Conference that adopted the revised Berne and Paris
Convention . ..is undoubtedly the most significant milestone in the
' For industrialized
development of intellectual property in this century."97
regions, such as the United States and Europe, "intellectual capital" has
become both an important asset to protect and a field of comparative
advantage to withhold.9 8 For that reason, the TRIPs agreement has been
clearly embedded with western interests by defining IPRs only in terms of
their industrial application." Indeed, it is an evident example of an

93. See GERI ETAL., supra note 14, at 287.
94. See generally Boyle, supra note 16.
95. Id. at 71.
96. See supratext accompanying note 4. It covers copyright and related rights, trademarks,
geographical indications, industrial design, patents, and layout-designs of integrated circuits. See
TRIPs Agreement, supranote 4, arts. 9, 15, 22, 25, 27, 35.
97. See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPs AGREEMENT. DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 3
(1998).
98. A proof of the paramount importance of "intellectual assets," in the United States, is the
"Special 301" section in the U.S. Code. See § 182 of the Trade and TariffAct of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 2411 (2004), as amended by Section 1303 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988. It requires the United States Trade Representative to regard as an "unreasonable" trade
practice- and hence to impose retaliation measures- the denial by a foreign government of fair
and equitable "provision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights
notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country may be in compliance with the specific obligations
of the TRIPs agreement." Id.
99. See TRIPs Agreement, supranote 4, art. 27 (1); see also Gathii, supra note 47, at 762.
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agreement based on western values and approaches.' 00 The TRIPs
agreement imposes a strong form of IPRs, which protect the rights holder,
and provides very limited room for exceptions;"' the dominant
construction of the agreement has been, since 2a few years ago, to
foreground the logic of property as a commodity.11
However, through a deeper analysis of the agreement, it is possible to
see that the commodity conception of IPRs is not the only vision of private
property embedded in the TRIPs agreement (even though it is undoubtedly
the dominant one). In the TRIPs agreement, a public policy strand
(including human rights concerns, environmentalism and public health)
stands in tension with the commodity logic of IPRs. Indeed, the regulatory
framework of the TRIPs agreement does allow an interpretation consistent
with a public policy perspective.'0 3 For example, Article 6 makes a
provision" 4 for international exhaustion which allows parallel
importations.' 05 Article 30 permits states to provide limited exceptions to
10 6
the exclusive right conferred by a patent to the holder of the rights.
Article 7 strikes a balance between the interests of the owner of an IPR and
consumers. In general, the text of the TRIPs agreement, read in
conjunction with the Doha Declaration, permits an interpretation of the
TRIPs agreement
which is more permeable to the public policy
10 7
perspective.
This tension, in the pre-TRIPs era, was mitigated by international
agreements that provided mechanisms (such as rules requiring compulsory
license) to strike a balance among the competitive interests.'" With the

100. See, e.g., JAYASHREE WAtAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2001).
101. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 30, 31.
102. See Gathii, supra note 47, at 747.
103. This is particularly true after the Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health.
See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 84.
104. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 6.
105. Under a regime of international exhaustion, the patent owner's right to control the use
and resale of product embodying the patented invention is exhausted, in a given country, once the
patent owner sells, or authorizes the sale of, that product anywhere in the world. Hence, it is
possible to import that product from another country (parallel importation). See Thomas F. Cotter,
Market Fundamentalismand the TRIPs Agreement, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 43 (2004).
106. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art 30.
107. See generally James T. Gathii, The Legal Status of the DhoaDeclarationon TRIPs and
PublicHealth Underthe Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (2002).
108. See generally Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
21 U.S.T. 1583 (as revised on July 14, 1967 in Stockholm); Berne Convention for the Protection
of Artistic and Literary Works, Sept. 9, 1886,25 U.S.T. 1341 (as revised on July 24, 1971 in Paris).
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adoption of the TRIPs agreement the tension has dramatically increased
between rights owners,' °9 interested in maximizing their profits, and the
consumers of IPRs interested in receiving a fair price and accessibility to
products." 0
V. CONCLUSION

The two ideas of property discussed above are the outcome of different
political perspectives. The idea of property as a market commodity is
based on the belief that free individuals in a society will act in a free
market through contractual instruments in order to maximize their
interests. This is the basic idea enshrined in the legal system WTO and in
the TRIPs agreement: the neoliberal creed,"' a form of "market
fundamentalism."" 2 The dialectic relationship between the two concepts
of property rights pervades every level of the debate about IPRs. Indeed,
it can be found in legal texts, such as the TRIPs agreement, legal
discussion,' 13 and judicial decisions." 4
It seems that the transition from one conception to the other is
continuing even though uneven and not periodic. It is a dialectic
relationship that sheds light on why and how intellectual property rights
are at present shaped. This may help in understanding the present flaws of
IPRs, and consequently, it may aid to correct them according to new
emerging needs that otherwise would probably be underestimated and put
in the shade. In fact, the dialectic relationship illuminates the actual
existence of IPRs and puts in evidence the imbalance (in terms above
described) of values and may spur lawmakers and, generally, the legal
debate to consider solutions aimed to strike a line in the continuous effort
to find a "fair" point of equilibrium. What "fair" means cannot be said, but
the simple awareness of this kind of relationship might help in this regard.
109. As a matter of fact, the TRIPs agreement incorporates most of the Paris and Berne
Conventions. Nonetheless, Article 31 of TRIPs set forth so many requirements in order to allow
"Other Use Without Authorizationof the Right Holder" that the tension, in a way mitigated by the
incorporation of the aforementioned agreements, is still existing in all its breadth.
110. See Gathii, supra note 47, at 759.
111. See id.at 737.
112. See JOSEPH E. STIGLrTZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DIscoNTENT 73-74 (2002) ("Market
Fundamentalism" is the idea that markets are a priori the solution to all problems, without taking
into account the defects that sometimes besets market.).
13. See Cotter, supra note 105.
114. See, e.g., United States- Import Prohibition Of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
AB 1998-4, Report of the Appellate Body, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/
dispu e/ab reportse.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).

